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Emerging IP Markets:  The Tokyo Grain Exchange non-GMO Soybean Contract 
 
 
 
 
This research provides an overview of the development of the Tokyo Grain Exchange non-GMO 
soybean contract as an identity preserved futures contract.  The development of this contract is 
unique, relative to the development of other new futures contracts, in that a mature conventional 
soybean futures contract exists.  Particular attention is given to necessary conditions for 
development of a new futures contract.  In evaluating these conditions it was determined that 
since inception of the Tokyo Grain Exchange non-GMO soybean futures contract, the contract 
functions like a mature futures contract.  This is unique in comparison to results of other studies 
evaluating the development of futures contracts.  Furthermore, the lack of a well defined and 
liquid cash non-GMO soybean market does not appear to hamper the development of the non-
GMO futures contract.  [EconLit citations:  G14, M31, Q13]. 
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Emerging IP Markets:  The Tokyo Grain Exchange non-GMO Soybean Contract 
 
1. Introduction 
Identity preservation (IP) garners much attention as agricultural producers and agribusinesses 
seek means by which to add value to commodities.  High lysine soybeans, high-oil corn, low-
lenoliec soybeans, low phosphorus corn, isoflavone soybeans, and non-transgenic soybeans are 
just a few examples of identity preserved grains and oilseeds that were developed for a specific 
end-use purpose.  Typically, identity preserved crops demand a market premium because of an 
increase in end-user value associated with quality characteristics or increased processing 
efficiency.  Little research is undertaken to assess the market functionality of identity preserved 
crops.  This is likely because of the lack of price information as many of these crops are 
marketed under contract, the terms of which are generally confidential.  No U.S. futures 
exchange offers a futures contract for an identity preserved grain or oilseed.  However, The 
Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE) began offering a non-GMO soybean futures contact in May 2000.  
This market is traded in addition to the conventional soybean contract offered at the TGE.  The 
objective of this research is to determine the functionality and effectiveness of identity preserved 
futures contracts. 
The non-GMO soybean price premiums are computed as the inter-market spread, i.e., as 
the difference in value between the TGE non-GMO soybean futures contract and the TGE 
conventional soybean contract for the nearby months between May 18, 2000 and March 22, 
20021.  Figure 1 provides a graphical summary of the TGE non-GMO soybean contract 
                                                 
1 As reference to U.S. soybean prices, on March 1, 2002 the March TGE non-GMO March 
futures price was $5.66, the TGE March conventional futures price was $5.22, the CBOT March 
futures was $4.465, and the St. Louis cash bid was $4.55. 
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premium.   Also, Table 1 provides a synopsis of the average premium value over the life of each 
contract traded since inception of the non-GMO contract.  During initial trading of the non-GMO 
contract, the premium over conventional soybeans was relatively large, followed by a significant 
drop where the premium became negative during the expiration month of the April 2001 
contract.  In subsequent trading months, the premium was around $0.30/bushel.  However, little 
is known about the functionality of this contract.  For example, does the TGE non-GMO soybean 
contract meet the criteria of a successful futures contract and how does it compare to mature U.S. 
futures contracts? 
Considerable attention is given to transgenic commodity issues, e.g., Heiman, Just, and 
Zilberman (2000); Miranowski et al.; Parcell and Kalaitzandonakes (2001); and Sparling, 
Turvey, and Mark (1999).  Furthermore, Parcell (2001) previously outlined the specifications 
and performance of the TGE non-GMO soybean contract.  Now that nearly two years of data 
exists on this contract, some fundamental understandings of the contract are reported.  For 
instance, in April 2001, mandatory labeling of non-GMO products began in Japan. Associated 
with this law was the potential for levying large fines or possible jail sentences against those not 
meeting the stringent threshold levels to qualify for non-GMO.  After the delivery period of the 
initial December 2000 contract, the non-GMO premium – relative to the conventional contract – 
became negative.  Long positions were concerned about taking delivery of non-GMO soybeans 
that would not meet the mandatory labeling requirements to take effect in April 2001. 
As noted by Pennings and Leuthold (1999), the expense of introducing a new futures 
contract is great, thus, understanding the factors contributing to contract viability are useful.  
There exists considerable research on “micro-level” and “macro-level” factors contributing to the 
viability of a new futures contract.  Macro-level factors are factors that relate to commodity 
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attributes (technical attributes).  Micro-level factors relate to subject-level (or user-level) 
attributes.  Both micro- and macro-level attributes are discussed in this study. 
 Previous research by Bollman, Thompson, Garcia (1996); Williams et al.(1998); Sanders 
and Pennings (1999); and Thompson, Garcia, and Wildman (1996) analyzed the functionality of 
new agricultural futures contracts.  Bollman, Thompson, Garcia (1996) analyzed the 
diammonium phosphate futures contract.  Williams et al. (1998) evaluated the Chinese Zhegzhou 
Commodity Exchange Mungbean futures contract.  Sanders and Pennnings (1999) evaluated the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange shrimp contract.  Thompson, Garcia, and Wildman (1996) 
analyzed the failure of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange High Fructose Corn Syrup futures 
contract.  The current study departs from previous studies in one important area.  The non-GMO 
soybean futures contract represents an identity preserved commodity that is derived from a 
mature conventional soybean futures contract, also allowing for non-GMO soybeans to be 
marketed as conventional soybeans.  Thus, there is always a liquid underlying cash market to 
arbitrage the non-GMO soybeans.  This study is organized as a case study in which the 
functionality and effectiveness of the TGE non-GMO soybean futures contract is compared to 
the functionality of either a successful or failed new futures contracts, which did not develop 
from a mature futures contract. 
As the TGE non-GMO soybean contract is still in its infancy, the term “successful 
commodity futures contract,” is used with caution.  The manuscript is laid out as an open-ended 
format – much like a diary – to address the issue of whether a successful emerging identity 
preserved market can exist in the presence of the necessary conditions for a successful futures 
contract. 
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2. Background of TGE non-GMO Soybean Contract2  
The Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE) began offering a non-GMO soybean contract in May 2000.  
In 1999-2000, Japan imported 4.75 million metric tons of soybeans, most of these soybean 
imports originated in the United States.  Soybeans primarily are used as inputs for Japanese food 
products.  Thus, as the percentage of acreage planted in transgenic crops in the United States 
increased (Figure 2) and consumer concerns over use of transgenic crops increased, consumers 
and processors in Japan began sourcing non-transgenic soybeans.  In addition, Japan adopted a 
mandatory labeling policy of non-GMO and GMO food products to begin in April 2001.  A 
natural progression for the price discovery process for a regulated differentiated market was 
development of a futures market contract.   
The TGE non-GMO soybean futures contract is the first such public traded commodity 
for a bioengineered crop.  Furthermore, this contract is considered as the first public futures 
contract for an identity-preserved crop.  Such a marketplace acts as a price discovery mechanism 
whereby a premium for the identity preserved crop, e.g., non-GMO soybean, is realized.  The 
objective of this article is to introduce this contract, compare it to a conventional soybean 
contract traded at the TGE, present the market premium, and compare the premium offered to the 
cost of segregating non-GMO soybeans. 
The non-GMO and conventional soybean futures contracts traded at the TGE are 
transacted through session trading with a single “provisional” price during the trading round.  
Trading is transacted via computer.  Each member of the exchange is linked to the main 
exchange computer and an abbreviated name of each member appears on the screen for everyone 
to see.  Exchange members indicate the number of buy and/or sell orders and these appear on the 
                                                 
2 This section was excerpted nearly verbatim from Parcell (2001) 
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screen next to their name.  As an initial “provisional” price is displayed, members determine 
whether to stay in the market or exit the market with a counter order.  The “provisional” price is 
fixed when the quantity of sell orders equals the quantity of buy orders.  If the initial 
“provisional” price offered does not cause equilibrium to occur, then the exchange operator 
changes the price until sell orders equal buy orders.  For example, if the number of buy orders 
exceeds the number of sell orders by 50 (appears at 50+ on the screen) then the exchange 
operator will increase the price incrementally until the number of sell orders equals the numbers 
of buy orders.  This process occurs for every trading month offered for the contract consecutively 
from the contract closest to expiration to the furthest deferred contract. 
 Table 2 highlights the difference in contract specifications between the TGE conventional 
and non-GMO contracts.  There are five primary contract specification and exchange 
requirement differences.  First, the contract size for the non-GMO contract is one-third of the 
size of the conventional contract (10,000 kg versus 30,000 kg).  Second, the position limits for 
the non-GMO contract is three times larger than the conventional contract.  This effectively 
allows hedgers of non-GMO soybeans to deliver or take delivery of an amount similar to the 
conventional soybean contract that is three times the contract size.  Third, the contract grades are 
slightly different locations of U.S. origin.  Fourth, deliverable quality grades are different.  Fifth, 
the initial margin for the non-GMO contract is 25,000 yen compared to 70,000 yen for the 
conventional contract.  The initial margin for the non-GMO contract is greater than one-third the 
size of the conventional.  This likely is due to the perceived greater volatility in the non-GMO 
market.  However, similar initial margin requirements are true of mini and full contracts traded 
in the United States. 
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3. A Successful Futures Contract? 
Various researchers (e.g., Black, 1986; Gray, 1978; Hieronymus, 1996; and Leuthold, Junkus, 
and Cordier, 1989) note necessary conditions for a successful commodity futures contract.  Table 
3 lists these necessary conditions, assesses to what extent the TGE non-GMO soybean contract 
meets the respective condition, and provides evidence for meeting the listed condition.  Because 
this market represents an emerging identity preserved commodity futures market contract, the 
focus of this research lies with discussions of the seven conditions listed in Table 3.  The 
following seven sub-sections highlight the suggested necessary conditions. 
 
3.1 Economic Need 
Economic need is different from economic justification.  Bullock, Desquilbet, and Nitsi (2001) 
evaluated economic justification for producing non-GMO crops, while others, e.g., Lusk et al. 
(2001), show the economic justification for marketing non-GMO products.  As the percentage of 
non-GMO U.S. soybean acres declines (Figure 2) supply of non-GMO soybeans tightens.  The 
demand for non-GMO soybeans in Asia is evident with the development of trade issues, and 
Bredahl documents processor demand for non-GMO inputs in the European Union.  Thus, 
antidotal evidence indicates an economic need for the TGE non-GMO contract.  The presence of 
the non-GMO soybean premium (Figure 1) is sufficient evidence to indicate economic need.3  A 
look at the TGE non-GMO soybean contract deliveries may provide more insight. 
 
                                                 
3 Furthermore, the presence of premium volatility (see Figure 8) ensures economic justification 
since a constant premium level indicates that non-GMO soybean hedgers could cross-hedge in 
the conventional soybean contract. 
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While it is difficult to assess directly the number of speculators and hedgers in this 
market, some generalities are made when relating the delivered quantity to the maximum open 
interest over the contract life (Williams et al., 1998).  For the TGE non-GMO soybean futures 
contract, the February and April 2002 contracts realized deliveries less than 1% of the maximum 
open interest of the contract life.  This percentage is similar to that observed for the TGE 
conventional soybean contract.  Also, this percentage is similar, if not below, ratio levels 
observed with commodities traded on the CBOT.  This indicates that there were not 
disproportionate deliveries to maximum open interest as compared to mature futures contracts. 
As the TGE non-GMO contract size is 10 metric tons (366.67 bushels), delivery of 117 
lots on the February 2002 contract indicates that 43,000 bushels of U.S. origin non-GMO 
soybeans traded hands in Japan.4  This is in comparison to the 249,000 bushels of U.S. origin 
conventional soybeans delivered on the February 2002 conventional soybean contract.  
Assuming that the proportion of Japanese users of non-GMO and conventional soybeans is 
similar to the proportion of hedged product, this indicates that 15% of the Japanese market is for 
non-GMO soybeans.  Using 1999-2000 import data, a 15% share of the Japanese soybean import 
market indicates a potential demand for 600,000 metric tons (22 million bushels) of non-GMO 
soybeans. 
 
3.2 Well Written Contract (Contract Specification) 
Contract provisions are important to the success of a futures contract (Powers, 1967).  Every 
transaction has three basic elements: the allocation of value, the allocation of risk, and the 
                                                 
4 For the April 2002 contract, 150 non-GMO soybean contracts and 173 conventional soybean 
contracts were delivered on.  This information became available after the data for the rest of this 
study was collected. 
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allocation of decision rights (Sykuta and Parcell, 2000).  Allocation of value is the distribution of 
gains from trade.  Allocation of risk is subjecting value to uncertainty.  Allocation of decision 
rights is the assignment of tasks in meeting the terms of trade.  In general, the contract 
specifications (see Table 2) are similar between the TGE conventional and non-GMO soybean 
contracts.   
Allocation of value is specified through arbitrage on the TGE.  Thus, market forces 
determine allocation of value.  For the current study, the allocation of risk and value are 
discussed together in relationship to a successful futures contract.  Allocation of risk, beyond 
typical futures contract production risk, is derived from the delivery grade contract specification.  
As noted by Thompson, Garcia, and Wildman (1996), the futures contract must be a close 
substitute for the underlying cash product.  The written specifications of the TGE non-GMO 
soybean contract provide sellers (those having the right to deliver) with considerable leeway in 
the quality delivered.  For an identity preserved market, quality is essential.  Why?  Identity 
preserved production is used for specific purposes, whereas, commodity production has various 
uses.  Most of the non-GMO soybeans in Japan are for food use (Nill, 2000).  Thus, the qualities 
beyond the primary characteristic, non-GMO, are essential to the usefulness of the good.  During 
the initial delivery periods of the non-GMO contract, there was concern by long positions of 
taking delivery of non-GMO soybeans that were of so poor quality that they could not be used as 
intended (Nill, 2000).  Furthermore, the specifications are vague regarding the tolerance level of 
percent of conventional soybeans in a deliverable lot of non-GMO soybeans.  Preceding 
mandatory labeling laws taking effect in April 2001, a tolerance level of 5% took effect for 
labeling “GMO Free” and a civil penalty levied for inappropriately claiming “GMO Free,” the 
non-GMO premium became negative.  That is, because the potential existed for Japanese firms 
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to take delivery of non-GMO soybeans that did not meet labeling standards, owning non-GMO 
soybeans became an economic bad.  Selling off began and the non-GMO soybean contract 
discounted relative to the conventional soybean contract.5 
 The Tokyo Grain Exchange determined allocation of decision rights when it established 
the non-GMO contract specifications.  The contract size of the non-GMO contract is one-third 
the size of the conventional contract, however, this difference seems plausible for a niche market 
situation, i.e., smaller, higher valued volumes being transacted.  Thus, allocation of decision 
rights between buyer and seller appears fair based on relative performance of the non-GMO 
contract to the conventional soybean contract, which trades under similar conditions.  Optimal 
allocation of decision rights is due likely to the use of warehouse delivery in transferring 
deliverable quantities.  Williams et al. (1998) contributed some of the success of the Chinese 
Mungbean contract to warehouse delivery. 
The non-GMO futures contract has a delivery period that begins one day prior to contract 
expiration.  This contract specification does not appear to hamper delivery.  In contract, Williams 
et al. (1998) contributed a portion of the Mungbean futures contract success to a delivery 
window beginning the first day of the contract expiration month.  U.S. grain and oilseed futures 
contacts allow for first delivery at the beginning of the contract expiration month.  Findings of 
current research suggest that the specified length of delivery window may be less important than 
previously hypothesized. 
 
                                                 
5 Also occurring during this time was a significant run up in the price of the conventional 
soybean contract relative to the non-GMO contract price.  This price increase is attributed to 
trade discussions regarding the limitation of U.S. soybean imports into Japan. 
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3.4 Well Defined and Liquid Underlying Cash Market 
A well-defined and liquid underlying cash market is important for assessing pricing effectiveness 
of the market (Black, 1986; Gray, 1978; Hieronymus, 1996; Leuthold, Junkus, and Cordier, 
1989; Williams et al., 1998).  The spot market for non-GMO soybean price information is thin.  
Harvest delivery or buyers call non-GMO production contracts, e.g., those offered through 
Optimum Quality Grains, often specify a fixed premium.  Thus, analyzing the ability for spatial 
arbitrage between the spot and futures price, to ascertain the thickness of the cash market, is 
impractical for this analysis.  The problem of lacking non-GMO soybean spot price information 
to analyze spatial arbitrage effectiveness is addressed by applying the methodology used by 
Williams et al. (1998) in assessing the arbitrage potential in the China Zhegzhou Commodity 
Exchange Mungbean futures contract. 
Instead of using spatial price relationships to analyze arbitrage effectiveness, Williams et 
al. (1998) used temporal price spreads, i.e., between contract months, to analyze arbitrage 
effectiveness by comparing the percentage difference in price across contracts to the carrying 
charge expressed as a percentage of price.6  The conceptual framework is used here to analyze 
arbitrage opportunities. The typical cost of carry in the non-GMO soybean market is around 4% 
to 5% over a two-month period. 7   
                                                 
6 Thompson, Garcia, and Wildman (1996) analyzed inter-temporal arbitrage in the High Fructose 
Corn Syrup contract using price levels. 
7 A conventional soybean contract results in a cost of carry of approximately 2.5% over a two 
month period, however, as shown by Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes (2000) the costs 
associated with storage of identity preserved grains/oilseeds are considerably greater than for 
conventional grains/oilseeds. 
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Thompson, Garcia, and Wildman (1996) found a significant inverse carrying charge for 
intertemporal arbitrage opportunities in the High Fructose Corn Syrup futures contract, but they 
attributed the inverse carrying charge to seasonality.  Williams et al. (1998) found a lack of 
intertemporal arbitrage toward the inception of the Mungbean futures contract, but as the 
contract matured the intertemporal arbitrage increased.  For the current study, Figure 3 shows a 
series of figures depicting the percentage spread between the current contract month and next 
deferred contract for the TGE non-GMO soybean contracts traded since contract inception on 
May 18, 2000.  Except for a few of the contracts near expiration, the arbitrage value is below the 
estimated cost of carry in the non-GMO soybean market.  There were periods of inverse carrying 
charges.  Inverse carry charges indicate that current demand is greater than future demand, and 
provide little incentive to hedge stocks (Thompson, Garcia, and Wildman, 1996).  Yet, for the 
current study, any significant inverse carrying charge was observed during the first few months 
of current contract trading or near the end of trading.  The most noticeable market based inverse 
carrying charge was for June 2001 delivery relative to April 2001.  This inverse carrying charge 
possibly was an anomaly associated with the establishment of the mandatory GMO-free labeling 
law in Japan.  Periods of arbitrage occurred near the end of each contract trading period, 
suggesting that hedgers may be concerned with delivery or storage – sustaining quality.  
Williams et al. (1998) found a similar result for the Mungbean futures contract.  Effective 
arbitrage in the TGE non-GMO soybean contract occurred much earlier in the life of the contract 
than for new futures contracts (e.g., Mungbean futures contract and High Fructose Corn Syrup 
futures contract). 
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3.5 Competitive Market Place 
A Walrasian (competitive) market exists where sellers and buyers take prices as given, cannot 
influence prices, and agents maximizes their objective function subject to the usual constraints so 
that the market is cleared in trade amongst each other.  In the previous section I argued the inter-
temporal arbitrage across contracts suggests the presence of a competitive market place.  This 
section expands on the previous section to assess whether this market conforms to the theory of a 
niche market that exhibits potential to market in a substitute market, i.e., convention TGE 
soybean futures contract.with some substitutability with a conventional market. 
Lence and Hayes (2001) show that when buyers (consumers) are willing to pay a 
premium for non-GMO soybeans, the market price for conventional soybeans should decrease to 
entice consumers to switch from non-GMO soybeans to conventional soybean consumption.  
Following the methodology of Lence and Hayes (2001), an increase in non-GMO soybean 
contract price (demand increasing relative to supply) should lead to a short-term decline in the 
price of the conventional soybean contract.  This hypothesis is tested using a Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) procedure to derive impulse response functions from a shock in the non-
GMO soybean price level.  This allows for assessing the size of the effect and the length of run 
of the effect to be assessed. 
The VAR model used here is a relatively simple empirical application.8   The data used is 
from the nearby non-GMO and conventional TGE soybean contract from May 18, 2000 through 
March 22, 2002.  The VAR model estimated is of the form: 
 
                                                 
8 A more advanced model incorporating the level of premium could be modeled, i.e., when the 
premium is greater than the cost of identity preservation.  For instance, Goodwin and Piggott 
(2001) incorporated threshold effects into regional grain marketing dynamics. 
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(1)                Y  (t) =  a  •  Constant +   a  •   X (t - i)  j 1j ij j
i=0
i=k∑
Where, Y(t) is the dependent variable and X(t-i) is the explanatory variable lagged i periods.9  
Figure 4 graphically represents the response to the conventional contract from one 
standard deviation in the non-GMO soybean contract price.  Results indicate that the 
conventional soybean contract price declines initially, as hypothesized by Lence and Hayes 
(2001), and then price readjusts.  Since only the nearby contract is used, the length of time 
required to return to equilibrium is overstated most likely.  This is one additional indication that 
the non-GMO soybean contract appears to behave competitively relative to the conventional 
soybean contract, i.e., conform to theory. 
 
3.6 Cross-Hedge Liquidity 
Liquidity is a key factor in assessing the ability to hedge in a futures market.  Pennings and 
Meulenberg (1997) and Thompson, Garcia (1996) argue that in the presence of thin markets 
substantial transaction costs may be incurred.  Incorporating transaction costs into the Ederington 
measure of hedging effectiveness, Pennings and Meulenberg (1997) find the risk minimizing 
hedge ratio is of the form: 
(2)     β σ σσ σ σ
* = −− −
sf smd
f md fm
2 2 2 d
                                                
 
 
Where, σ’s represent the usual variance or covariance terms, s represents spot price, f represents 
futures price, and md represents transaction costs.  With no market depth, equation (2) reduces to 
 
9  A lag length of six was chosen by minimizing the Akaike Information Criteria, and neither 
stationarity or ordering tests were performed.   
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the standard risk minimizing hedge ratio.  No cash price series exists for non-GMO soybeans; 
therefore, ascertaining the level of market liquidity in relation to transaction costs is difficult 
when using traditional methods like specified in equation 1. 
Figure 5 indicates the TGE non-GMO soybean nearby contract volume and open interest 
since inception of the contract.  The volume and open interest patterns shown are similar to those 
patterns observed in established futures markets.  A month or two prior to contract expiration 
volume and open interest are relatively large.  As contract expiration approaches, both volume 
and open interest decline.  The overall number of non-GMO soybean contracts traded is similar – 
in quantity of bushels transacted – to the conventional soybean contract (Figure 6).  That is, a 
ratio of less than, or equal to one-third indicates that more bushels of non-GMO soybeans were 
transacted than bushels of conventional soybeans. 
As a proxy for establishing cross-hedging liquidity via equation 2, the nearby contract 
volume to open interest ratio is computed (Figure 7).  Tilley and Campbell (1988) employ such a 
variable in capturing the ability of hedgers and speculators to enter or exit the market, in 
analyzing factors affecting Hard Red Winter Wheat basis patterns. The ratio of volume to open 
interest generally is similar to that for mature U.S. commodity futures contracts.   Furthermore, 
TGE non-GMO soybean February 2002 contract delivers were 8% of the maximum open interest 
for the expiration month.  The TGE conventional February 2002 contract deliveries were 18% of 
the maximum open interest for the expiration month.  Non-GMO contract deliveries as a 
percentage of maximum open interest in the expiration month are similar to that reported by 
Williams et al. (1998) and for mature future contracts in the U.S.  
 15
  
3.7 Price Volatility and Ability to Attract Speculators 
Futures price volatility is critical to attract speculators and to add liquidity to the market. Figure 
8 summarizes the 10-day moving average price coefficient of variation for the conventional, non-
GMO and inter-market spread (premium).  The coefficient of variation for the non-GMO and 
conventional soybean contract price is similar to that observed for mature U.S. contracts.  Yet, 
the coefficient of variation for the non-GMO soybean contract is similar to that for the 
conventional soybean contract.  As shown in the previous section, significant liquidity exists in 
the non-GMO soybean market.  These factors indicate that the conditions to entice speculators 
into this market are present. 
 
3.8 Residual Basis Risk 
Given that no spot market price information for non-GMO soybeans exists, assessing residual 
basis risk is difficult.  One measure of residual basis risk is the spread between the non-GMO 
and conventional contract.  As illustrated in Figure 8, the spread between contracts exhibits 
considerable variability relative to either individual contract.  This indicates a hedger cannot 
effectively use the conventional TGE soybean contract to hedge non-GMO soybean stocks.  This 
is an important characteristic of an identity preserved futures contract in that inter-market spread 
volatility suggests economic need. 
 
4. Implications for Identity Preserved New Futures Contracts 
There is a relatively thin research base from which to derive the empirical foundations for 
Irwin’s (1954) research analyzing the functionality of emerging identity preserved futures 
contract.  More often, as of late, agricultural economists find themselves attempting to explain 
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the impact of thin cash markets and the impact on futures markets because of thin cash markets.  
Yet, the TGE non-GMO soybean contract arose from a truly thin market, i.e., the difficulty in 
attaining private or public non-GMO soybean price information.  The origination and sustained 
trading volume (Figure 9) in the TGE non-GMO soybean futures contract suggests futures 
markets can survive in the face of an increasing contract focused agricultural marketing sector 
(delivery on contracts suggests hedging is taking place in the contract).  As noted by Williams et 
al. (1998) for the Mungbean futures contract, the non-GMO futures contract also may stimulate 
the growth of a non-GMO spot market. 
Relative to other new futures contracts, volume in the non-GMO soybean contract has 
sustained.  Why?  Possibly because producers and processors of soybeans, relative to other 
commodities, are more experienced in using futures markets.  Schroeder et al. (1998) finds 
grain/oilseed producers are more likely to use futures than livestock producers.  According to the 
April 2, 2002 Commodity Futures Trading Commission commitment of trader reports, 
grain/oilseed commercials held four times as many futures positions as did livestock 
commercials.  In general there is an economic need for this futures contract. 
As noted by Lacroix and Varangis (1996) and Williams et al. (1998), allocation of value 
in quality attributes partially is off set by the commodity exchange when warehouse delivery is 
required of the commodity.  As is detailed in Table 2, the non-GMO contract specification 
indicates warehouse delivery.  Thus, contract specification for a quality-based product may 
require warehouse delivery, and receipt, to be successful.  However, the length of delivery period 
may not need to be as long as once hypothesized. 
Considerable research exists that explains the process of market breakdowns when goods 
of differing quality are marketed (and asymmetric information exists about these qualities).  This 
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concept is better known as the “market for lemons.”  Ultimately, to address allocation of risks 
and value between trading partners (two of the three aspects of terms of trade) the TGE non-
GMO contract specification may need tweaking to align with regulatory policy.10 
Thin markets lead to market power by the buyer or seller, and asymmetric quality 
information leads to inefficient markets, which may especially be true for thinly traded product 
futures contracts.  The non-GMO futures contract has sufficient liquidity and volume to attract 
hedgers, price volatility to attract speculators, and its arbitrage patterns are consistent with 
mature futures contracts.  Furthermore, this study refutes Irwin’s (1954) argument that new 
futures contracts develop slowly.  Williams et al. (1998) observed the Chinese Mungbean futures 
contract developed over a two to three year period.  The TGE non-GMO soybean contract 
developed quickly.  This is due most likely to the growth of this contract from the TGE 
conventional soybean contract.  
The TGE non-GMO soybean contract has potential to become a successful futures 
contract.  A likely contributing factor to this is the emergence of the non-GMO soybean contract 
from the mature TGE conventional soybean contract.  Thus, development of U.S. futures 
contract for identity preserved commodities may have the greatest success when aligned with 
mature contracts.  An economic need, of course, supercedes any other attribute of a successful 
futures contract.  Table 3 summarizes the findings of this study in relationship to the seven initial  
 
                                                 
10 To date, no specification changes occurred with the TGE non-GMO soybean contract.  
Japanese businesses transact business primarily through trust and relationships, i.e., culture, so 
that non-GMO soybean futures contract are likely enforced explicitly.  Effectiveness of U.S. 
origin IP contracts may require implicit specification changes. 
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necessary criteria listed for a successful futures contract.  The criteria in Table 3 are listed 
(ranked) according their contribution to the development of a successful futures contract.  
“Sufficient” as opposed to “necessary” 
This is a case study of information impacts and price integration issues related to the 
start-up of the Tokyo Grain Exchange Non-GMO soybean futures contract.  Understanding the 
functionality of such markets may assist persons in better understanding how U.S. futures 
markets for quality based commodities may be established.  Furthermore, information is 
garnered about the futures market price discovery effectiveness in the presence of thin cash 
markets. 
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Figure 1.  Non - GMO soybean premium computed as the difference between the TGE non-
GMO and conventional soybean price quote off the nearby contract (5/18/00 through 3/22/02) 
 
 
Figure 2.  Rate of adoption of bioengineered crops in the United States (source: USDA) 
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Figure 3.  Percentage price spread between current futures contract and next deferred futures 
contract. 
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Figure 4.  
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Figure 5.  Nearby TGE non-GMO contract volume and open interest. 
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Figure 6.  Ratio of volume of conventional to non-GMO TGE contract (December 2001 contract) 
 
 
Figure 7.  Ratio of nearby TGE non-GMO soybean contract volume to open interest, since 
inception of contract. 
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Figure 8.  Ten-day TGE moving coefficient of variation for non-GMO Premium, non-GMO 
contract, and conventional soybean contract (December 2001 contract). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Average daily TGE non-GMO soybean trading volume over the life of the various 
contract months. 
 
note:  * indicates contract has not yet expired 
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 Table 1.  Summary statistics of non-GMO premiums ($/bushel) 
Calendar Year 
Contract Month 2000 2001 2002 
February N/A $0.28 $0.31 
  ($0.16) ($0.07) 
    
April N/A $0.36 $0.31* 
  ($0.31) ($0.06) 
    
June N/A $0.29 $0.28* 
  ($0.14) ($0.04) 
    
August N/A $0.29 $0.28* 
  ($0.17) ($0.03) 
    
October N/A $0.29 $0.29* 
  ($0.17) ($0.03) 
    
December $0.53 $0.29 $0.31* 
 ($0.19) ($0.11) ($0.04) 
    
Note, value in parentheses ( ) is the premium standard deviation over the life of the contract 
* As of 3/22/2002 
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Table 2.  TGE contract specifications   
 Conventional Soybeans Non GMO Soybeans 
Launched March 1984 May 2000 
Contract Size 30,000 Kg / 1180 bu. 10,000 kg / 392 bu. 
Delivery Months February, April, June, August October, December within a 12 month period  Same as conventional 
Price Quotation Yen per 1,000 kg Yen per 1,000 kg (100 yen per contract) 
Minimum Price 
Fluctuation 
10 yen per 1,000 kg (300 yen per contract) 10 yen per 1,000 kg (100 yen per contract) 
Maximum Price 
Fluctuation 
1,000 yen per 1,000 kg, if the standard price is under 20,000 yen 
1,200 yen per 1,000 kg, if the standard price is from 20,000 yen to, but not including 
40,000 yen. 
1,400 yen per 1,000 kg, if the standard price is from 40,000 yen and up 
No price limits in the current month from the 15th of the delivery month 
Same as conventional 
Position Limits Current delivery month 100 lots, 1st contract month following the current delivery 
month 200; 2nd contract month 500 lots and 1,500 lots from the 3rd contract month 
onwards 
Current delivery month 300 lots, 1st contract 
month following the current delivery month 
600; 2nd contract month 1,500 lots and 
3,000 lots from the 3rd contract month 
onwards 
Last Trading Day 2 business days prior to the delivery day Same as conventional 
Delivery Day 1 business day prior to the last business day of the delivery month.  December 24 for 
December contract; if not a business day, then the delivery day is moved up to the 
nearest business day. 
Same as conventional 
 
Contract Grade 11 
GMO or a mixture of GMO and non-GMO No. 2 yellow soybeans of Indiana, Ohio, 
and Michigan origin produced in the U.S.A. (Non screened, stored in silo.) 
Identity preserved non-GMO No. 2 yellow 
soybeans of Indiana, Ohio and Michigan 
origin produced in the U.S.A. (Non-
screened, stored in silo) 
Deliverable Grade GMO or a mixture of GMO and non-GMO No 2 yellow soybeans of Iowa, Illinois 
and Wisconsin origin produced in the U.S.A. (Non-screened, stored in silo). 
Effective from the April 2001 contract month and onward months. 
Identity preserved non-GMO No.2 yellow 
soybeans of Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin 
origin produced in the U.S.A. (Non-
screened, stored in silo) 
Method of 
Settlement 12 
Physical delivery by warehouse receipt Physical delivery by designated warehouse 
receipt 
Delivery Points 13 Exchange designated warehouses in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama Exchange designated warehouses in Tokyo, 
Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama. 
Initial Customer 
Margin 
70,000 yen 25,000 yen 
                                                 
11 At TGE Contract Grade also is referred to as Standard Grade for Non-GMO Soybean Futures 
12 TGE also refers to Method of Settlement as Delivery System for Non-GMO Soybeans Contracts 
13 TGE also refers to Delivery Points as Delivery Locations for Non-GMO Soybeans Contracts 
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Table 3.  Suggested necessary conditions for a successful futures contract 
 
 
Characteristic 
Is attribute 
present for TGE 
non-GMO 
soybean contract? 
 
Comment of characteristic for TGE non-GMO 
soybean contract 
 
Economic need 
 
 
yes 
Relatively high volume, U.S. production is 
developing for these markets, and consumer 
demand is apparent. 
 
 
Well written contract 
 
 
marginal/yes 
Contract specifications lack tolerance level for 
contamination, but use of warehouse delivery 
alleviates some concern over distribution of value, 
risks, and decision rights between trading partners. 
 
Well defined and thick 
underlying cash market 
 
?/yes Inter-temporal arbitrage appears to keep inter-
temporal returns at or below cost of carry in the 
market. 
 
Competitive marketplace 
 
yes/maybe Antidotal evidence suggesting a competitive 
market.  Arbitrage is occurring and relationship 
between non-GMO and conventional contracts 
appear to conform to theory. 
 
Cross-hedge liquidity 
 
yes Volume and open interest, and ratio of volume to 
open interest, follow patterns and levels observed 
in mature futures contracts. 
 
Price volatility and 
ability to attract 
speculators 
 
yes Price volatility is similar to that for mature 
commodity futures contracts. 
 
Residual basis risk 
 
? Spread between non-GMO and conventional 
soybean contract exhibits considerable risk.  Thus, 
non-GMO soybean hedgers could not effectively 
cross-hedge using the conventional soybean 
contract. 
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